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Reviving Heritage in Post-Soviet 
Eastern Europe: A Visual 
Approach To National Identity 
 
Frances W Harrison 
 
Introduction 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, countries across Eastern Europe have 
gained their independence. This 
independence however, has come at a cost 
as each former Soviet republic has struggled 
to strengthen its unique national identity and 
heritage. I focus on the Baltic States, 
Belarus and Ukraine to demonstrate the 
diverse responses to change; as countries 
emerging from years of Sovietization. In this 
article, I argue that visual symbols of 
cultural heritage are inherently controversial 
in Eastern Europe because they reflect 
Soviet ideology and preserve its memory. 
Places of public gathering, monuments and 
human performance, which contain key 
symbols about peoples’ heritage, are pivotal 
factors in restructuring notions of national 
identity. Although symbols of the Soviet era 
have been partially dismantled since the 
collapse of communism, I argue that these 
visual reminders make a strong contribution 
to incorporating Soviet heritage into national 
identity today. I examine how interpretations 
of imagery by the public are complex and 
often controversial, and illustrate the 
difficulties of maintaining a strong national 
unity in the post-Soviet era. 
 
Visual Heritage in Soviet and Post-Soviet 
Eastern Europe 
Constructing national identity was 
remarkably successful during Stalinism 
because its foundation was heavily built 
upon symbols of Soviet heritage. From an 
anthropological point of view, heritage 
refers to the contemporary and selective use 
of the past and exists at the local, national 
and multinational levels (Graham et al. 
2000:17). While heritage in all of its 
complexity incorporates both tangible 
objects and the intangible ideas that 
surround them, it is generally thought by 
heritage scholars that national heritage 
strictly involves the tangible1 . Referring 
specifically to what archaeologist Laurajane 
Smith describes as the “monumental” (2006: 
29); the tangible aspect of heritage is often 
characterized by what is known as 
Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD). The 
focus of AHD constitutes historical 
legitimacy of groups with power, along with 
the incentive to produce objects and places 
that are aesthetically pleasing for the public 
(Smith 2006: 29). The message of Stalinism 
was visually successful in its time because 
of this monumental influence and 
proliferation in public spaces.  
In the early 20th century starting with 
Vladimir Lenin and exemplified under 
Joseph Stalin, totalitarian art and socialist 
realism were administered by the 
government at the national level. The 
incentive was to promote a sense of 
uniformity among the diverse peoples 
coalesced into the USSR, which would 
unconsciously lend allegiance to the 
communist state (Groys 2005:113). 
Sovietization in the Eastern Bloc countries 
utilized a manipulative environment by 
combining visual messages with an enforced 
political ideology. Aesthetics in designing 
urban landscapes and the utilization of 
propagandist imagery were intended to unify 
any political controversies felt by oppressed 
populations. Lenin’s initial idea was to 
educate masses of people without the need 
for literacy, and he encouraged this 
phenomenon by visually altering public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See Harrison, Rodney. 2010. Understanding the 
Politics of Heritage. New York: Manchester  
University Press and Smith, Laurajane. 2006. Uses of 
Heritage. New York: Routledge for further discussion 
of the tangible sphere of national of heritage. 
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spaces. Lenin passed the “Plan for 
Monumental Propaganda”, a decree that 
allowed him to tear down tsarist monuments 
and rename streets and cities that no longer 
represented what he thought to be 
nationalistically important (Wanner 1998: 
176).  
What began during Lenin’s influence 
was amplified to a much greater degree 
under Stalin’s totalitarian regime. Monu-
ments to Lenin were intentionally re-
characterized with more aggressive facial 
expressions and body language, and statues 
of Stalin exhibited paternalistic yet 
intimidating features. Stalin was the face of 
“socialist paternalism”, a term that 
anthropologist Katherine Verdery (1996:25) 
describes as a contract made between the 
Soviet Father; the Communist Party and his 
Children; the subjects of Soviet ideology. 
Citizens of the USSR would have their basic 
needs met by this father figure, so long as 
they paid head to his political message and 
did not seek an alternative source (1996:25). 
To have Stalin’s image in public spaces 
served as a reminder to fear deviation from 
this contract. 
Constructivist architecture, charact-
erized in part by the aesthetic 
homogenization of public buildings, also 
flourished under Stalinism. No building was 
to stand out against the other, an ideal that 
incorporated the destruction or conversion 
of historical buildings to fit the profile Stalin 
stressed (Groys 2005:117). These changes 
are reflective of Stalin’s goal to homogenize 
millions of people into one dominant 
national identity, an effort which has had a 
lasting effect on how people view 
themselves and the Soviet era today.  
When considering AHD as 
discussed, its tangible sphere has 
significantly shaped collective notions of 
heritage because of its strong publicity. 
According to archaeologist Rodney Harrison 
however, differential access to the public 
realm and thus “heritage knowledge” further 
influences how visual, tangible objects are 
socially evaluated (2010:11). In this view I 
am primarily concerned with the 
monumental objects of national and 
multinational heritage, but as loci for multi-
vocal, subjective interpretation. Although 
the focal point of AHD scholarship is the 
tangible sphere, the meaning of heritage and 
thus nationalistic ideas is socially negotiated 
over time and space, and can either separate 
or bind people together. This is why visual 
reinforcement has so much credence in 
times of crisis; creating what cultural 
historian Robert Hewison calls a “nostalgic 
impulse” to memorialize heritage objects as 
historically significant (1987:47). The 
monumental objects of heritage installed 
under communism sought to create a 
collective identity, but they offer disparate 
notions of national identity in contemporary 
discourse. In the following pages I explore 
visual symbols of Soviet heritage and Soviet 
remembrance in Eastern Europe to 
illuminate the controversies of national 
identity.  
 
Communism Enclosed: An Outdoor Museum 
in Lithuania 
To demonstrate the concept of visual 
heritage, the southernmost of the Baltic 
States illustrates how national identity has 
been rekindled in the post-Soviet era. 
Lithuania has an extensive history of 
freedom and independence and was once a 
vast political territory that stretched over 
much of Eastern Europe. After enduring 
intermittent occupation from Polish, German 
and Russian forces, Lithuania was the first 
of the Baltic States to declare its 
independence from the USSR, and has since 
been fighting to reclaim its forgotten history 
(Misiunas and Taagepera 1993:323-4). In 
the post-Soviet era, research has shown that 
the Lithuanian people have taken initiative 
in defining who they are as a nation by 
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recuperating traditions and historical figures 
suppressed under communism. According to 
anthropologist Gediminas Lankauskas, these 
emblems of heritage are symbolic of 
Lithuania’s pre-Soviet values and have 
reappeared in the community as ceremonies, 
museum exhibits and memorials to the 
country’s heroic, medieval rulers (2006:33). 
The visual impact has been significant, but a 
memorialization of considerable controversy 
demonstrates how Lithuania has 
acknowledged its recent Soviet past.  
Grūtas Park is an outdoor museum 
and recreational park in southern Lithuania. 
The park displays more than eighty Soviet-
era monuments of Lenin, Stalin and 
communist party leaders. Designed in the 
style of socialist realism and emulating a 
Soviet gulag, the park is intended to have its 
visitors, in the words of its founder Viliumas 
Malinauskas, “understand what dictatorships 
are capable of and what tools they use to 
brainwash people” (Anusaite 2007:1). The 
statues are situated along a two-kilometer 
pathway in which visitors are guided 
through a space reflective of Siberia. 
Imitative watchtowers and remnants of 
concentration camps confine the former 
Soviet idols to a place of exile. The statues 
are also no longer on pedestals or the focal 
point of aesthetic design that would have 
attracted attention in an urban setting. 
Ultimately, the goal of the monument 
exhibit is to render Soviet ideology as if in a 
mock retribution, or as if “naked” in order to 
expose the oppression it yielded (Grūto 
Parkas 2004:1). 
 In addition to the statues, the late 
USSR is further evoked through 
reenactments of Soviet ceremonies and 
holidays, museum exhibits of Soviet relics 
and iconography, and a café where faux Red 
Pioneers; members of a pro-Soviet youth 
group, serve “nostalgic” dishes from the 
communist era (Grūto Parkas 2004). 
Whether or not these dishes are meant to 
encourage longings for a time when food 
variety was limited but nevertheless stable, 
in the minds of many the Soviet-style meals 
are a success. For others, the nostalgic café 
ironically represents the Soviet political 
menu as distasteful. 
The additional elements of Grūtas 
Park are meant to symbolize what founder 
Malinauskas described as “tools…to 
brainwash” (Anusaite 2007:1), they engage 
visitors in an encapsulating experience in 
order to understand at least a glimpse of 
what Soviet communism was like. The 
monuments in particular, which were once 
politically imposing in public Lithuanian 
spaces, have become neutralized in their 
current position at Grūtas Park. When a 
monument is neutralized, it is stripped of its 
political significance it once maintained as a 
centerpiece in public spaces. In this way, the 
park allows people who lived under 
communist rule to look at the Soviet regime 
from a different angle, to critique it without 
suffering any form of repercussion 
(Lankauskas 2006:37-38). The fact that the 
park draws on memory and visual entities 
for a constructive purpose exemplifies 
visitors as participants in a material and 
ideational relationship. Additionally, Grūtas 
Park’s location in Druskininkai, a rural town 
surrounded by forest, is the complete 
opposite of the Soviet statues’ former 
setting, making them all the less powerful. 
Monuments have often been used for 
political purposes, and those erected during 
Soviet communism were designed to 
homogenize diverse national identities under 
a single ideology. This is a major reason 
why Grūtas Park is so controversial, because 
the monuments serve as a reminder of the 
Soviet regime. Many Lithuanians see the 
visual irony of Grūtas Park as disrespectful 
to the memory of citizens who suffered or 
were killed by communists, and want the 
contents of the park destroyed (Anusaite 
2007:2). Like many of the other former 
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Eastern Bloc countries, Lithuania’s current 
socioeconomic instability as a transitional 
state also comes into question when visiting 
Grūtas Park. Its viewers are exposed to the 
conformity yet perceived stability of the 
Soviet System, and encouraged to 
contemplate the adversities of both 
communism and Western ideals of 
capitalism. The rapid pace of change in 
Lithuania has produced socio-economic 
stress, and it has been psychologically 
taxing for much of the population (Groudis 
2009:3B).  
The question of what to do with 
monuments that have caused negative 
experiences for people has not yielded easy 
or unified answers in the post-Soviet 
republics. Thousands of monuments were 
dismantled following the break-up of the 
USSR, but not all of them were destroyed.  
Stanford Levinson describes the destruction 
of monuments as a way of forgetting, which 
is hardly an act that will bring about any 
form of resolution (1998:69). Outdoor 
museums such as Grūtas Park have provided 
an alternative solution for statues that no 
longer recognize the authority of the Soviet 
regime. A park of similar significance, 
Statue Park resides on the outskirts of 
Budapest, Hungary. Like Grūtas Park in the 
south of Lithuania, its location in an 
isolated, socially unknown area is also 
intentionally neutralized, a “place without 
spirit” according to art historian Hedvig 
Turai (2009:97). Rather than forgetting, 
Statue Park actively remembers the past in 
order to learn from and to ascertain that 
similar situations do not occur in the future. 
The outdoor museum houses monuments of 
both the Nazi and Soviet ideologies, which 
brings two historically powerful regimes to 
mind when visitors walk through the exhibit. 
Turai states that the monuments are not 
placed in the park as artwork; a motive some 
statue museums use to “avoid 
responsibility”, but to visually provoke 
discourse about fascism and communism 
(2009:101). 
What is intriguing about Hedvig 
Turai’s argument for Statue Park is the 
theory she draws on to compare Fascism and 
Communism. The monuments in the park 
visually provoke recollections or perceptions 
about the Nazi and Soviet regimes in which 
the crimes of the former are equated with 
hot memories and the latter equated with 
cold memories2 (Turai 2009:99). Turai 
suggests that contemporary, hot memories of 
Fascism and events such as the Holocaust 
are equivalent to an “open wound” because 
they are more difficult to forgive and move 
on. Conversely, the events implemented 
under Stalinism in this hot-cold concept are 
thought to be cold memories, or “closed” 
(2009:99) because recalling the communist 
past can be more ambiguous or neutral 
depending on the topic. This is especially 
true of a country like Hungary where the 
Nazis had greater presence during World 
War II than did the Communist Party. 
 The concept of cold memory is also 
not suggesting that Stalin is free of blame; 
committing genocides and implementing 
oppressive political policies are certainly 
emotional memories, but are often 
understood through closed mentalities.  
Turai references the common knowledge 
that there is a specific “etiquette” for 
discussing Nazism and Hitler because of 
how delicate and traumatic the topics are, 
while discussions of communism do not 
have the same level of caution (2009:99). It 
is evident in both Statue Park and Grūtas 
Park however that as visitors, viewing the 
monuments will inevitably make people 
uncomfortable and uncertain of what is 
considered appropriate behavior (Hwang 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Turai adapts this metaphor from the work of 
historian Charles S. Maier. See Maier, Charles S. 
“Hot Memory…Cold Memory: On the Political Half-
life of Fascist and Communist Memory”, Transit 
N.22 (2002). 
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2009:71). One of the most important 
elements of Grūtas Park is the position 
visitors take when being reminded of a 
recent, grievous history. Visually engaging 
the monuments out of their original, Soviet 
context reverses the role of authority; the 
viewer becomes empowered by confronting 
the repressive regime (Lankauskas 2006:37).  
It is a reasonably similar environ-
ment at Statue Park, with the additional 
dynamic of some monuments that have 
commemorated the Soviets’ victory over the 
Nazis (Levinson 1998:72). Although Hedvig 
Turai reflects on the use of irony in both 
parks, she criticizes Grūtas Park for utilizing 
“easy, mocking solutions” to address the 
recent Soviet past, while Statue Park’s 
solutions for acknowledging Fascism and 
Communism possess a more intellectual 
attitude (2009:101). Turai is incorrect in her 
statement here because the pursuit of both 
parks is to actively remember the past, 
however offensive or controversial it is to do 
so. Statue Park and Grūtas Park are unique 
places in post-socialist countries where after 
the fall of communism, imagery symbolic of 
oppression has more space for critique. As 
long as the ability to remember rather than 
forget is apparent, the parks are positively 
constructive. And while there may be more 
room for laughter in Grūtas Park, by 
drawing on memory to alleviate unsettled 
issues, laughter is just as well one of the best 
remedies (Lankauskas 2006:34). 
Engaging with monuments in these 
sanctioned, neutralized spaces has allowed 
people to learn from the past and to 
conceptualize hopes for the future. The 
monuments themselves are neutralized 
because they are situated outside of an area 
of any political or social relevance, and in 
that context do not make a biased statement. 
Having the freedom for dialogue about the 
past generates ideas about heritage and, 
likely stirring ideas about what heritage used 
to mean, aids in the reconstruction of 
national identity. Despite the fact that 
Soviet-era monuments are contentious no 
matter where they are on display in post-
Soviet countries, the public exhibitions serve 
a constructive purpose because they allow 
the past to be open for discussion.  
 
A Country Divided: Contested Monuments 
in Ukraine 
Soviet-era statues are not limited to 
Grūtas Park and Statue Park, but still 
permeate much of the post-Soviet landscape 
in Eastern Europe. In Ukraine, there is little 
neutralized space for the contemplation of 
communist leaders; monumental statues 
continue instead to be the source of much 
tension in occupying central public spaces. 
Essentially, the nation has been politically 
divided between the more democratically-
moving west and the eastern region, which 
shares strong ties with Russia and is heavily 
influenced by the Communist Party. In the 
footsteps of the Soviet use of aesthetics to 
meet political ends, a “war of monuments” 
of sorts is currently taking place in Ukraine 
(Etkind 2011:1). Today’s Communist Party 
is still actively involved in adding to or 
refurbishing the more than two thousand 
monuments that continue to occupy space in 
central and eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian 
nationalists have been characterized 
negatively as “hooligans” or even as far as 
“terrorists” in response to the damages they 
have inflicted upon a number of monuments 
to Lenin and Stalin (Union 2009). 
One such Lenin monument, located 
in Kiev’s Besarabsky Market, has been the 
target of several rounds of vandalism and 
political anguish. In early 2009, a nationalist 
group damaged the face and hand of the 
Lenin monument. Several months later, the 
Communist Party held a ceremony for the 
unveiling of the restored monument, which 
was promptly splattered with red paint by 
Ukrainian nationalists (Interfax-Ukraine 
2009). Besarabsky Market is clearly a site of 
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competing identities and contradictory 
feelings about the communist past.  
On the border of Russia in Ukraine’s 
eastern region, the city Kharviv possesses 
one of the largest public squares in the 
world.  Like many public locations and 
street names subject to being renamed since 
the Soviet era, the square was renamed from 
Dzerzhinsky Square to Freedom Square 
after Ukraine’s independence in 1991 
(Ukraine 2011:1). According to anthrop-
ologist Catherine Wanner (1998), the 
renaming of the square and reconfiguration 
of its physical surroundings, which include 
constructivist architecture, has caused many 
Kharkiv residents to become psycho-
logically disoriented. She further asserts that 
many locals of Kharkiv feel ambiguous 
toward political changes and their 
subsequent meaning in the community 
(1998:181). The key focus of Freedom 
Square is the Lenin monument, an inherent 
contradiction, which commands the 
entranceway into the square. 
 The monument was erected in 1963, 
and while it continues to dominate the 
attention of the park, its audience is 
characterized by multiple histories and 
experiences in response to the Soviet Union. 
In order for a monument to represent its 
political vision successfully, it has to appeal 
to the public by being persuasive and in a 
way that fosters unity without conformity 
(Miles 2006:58). Similar to the other former 
Soviet republics, monuments were certainly 
utilized for being visually persuasive and to 
even cause fear from what is being 
represented by it. Since the collapse of the 
USSR, many Ukrainians appreciate 
monuments as a reminder of a past to learn 
from rather than to forget. Catherine Wanner 
references a Ukrainian informant who 
stated, “We should keep all of these horrible 
monuments as a reminder of our history” 
(1998:174). Yet with a Lenin monument in 
Kharkiv’s Freedom Square; in a largely pro-
Soviet region, freedom from communist 
influence is not readily apparent.  
While the sociopolitical division of 
Ukraine is not limited to an “east-west 
dichotomy” (Wanner 1998:17), the eastern 
region is characterized by a linguistically 
Russian, and extensively pro-communist 
population. (Yekelchyk 2007:199) Reflect-
ively, the grand monuments of Soviet and 
communist leaders such as the one in 
Freedom Square dominate the landscape. 
This is not the case in cities across western 
Ukraine however. The region is largely 
made up of ethnic and nationalistic 
Ukrainians; who have been forward in 
recent years in presenting their Ukrainian, if 
not “anti-Soviet” (Wanner 1998:126-8) 
heritage. 
 In the city of L’viv, located in the 
heart of western Ukraine, a refurbishing of 
national identity has taken place. Although a 
small, quaint city compared to Kiev and 
Kharviv, the dominance of a new visual 
heritage has taken root in L’viv. In the 
center of L’viv there was once a monument 
of Lenin, but in 1992 that monument was 
taken down and replaced with a new icon; 
Taras Shevchencko. Shevchenko, who lived 
from 1814 to 1861, never actually visited 
L’viv but his image represents something 
greater than himself (Yekelchyk 2007:138). 
He was a poet, often referred to as the 
Ukrainian Bard, who represents a symbol of 
Ukrainian national identity. Shevchenko’s 
position in Ukraine’s history has been 
tampered with for the Soviet cause. 
Historian Serhy Yekelchyk describes how 
during the Soviet era, communists used his 
image to portray him as a supporter of 
Soviet culture and by extension its political 
agendas (2007:138). The Soviets erected 
monuments of Shevchenko across Ukraine 
specifically to unify Ukrainian and Soviet 
identity. Over time, the location of his 
monuments became meeting places for 
Ukrainian nationalist groups, who by then 
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had accepted him as a spiritual “father”, to 
fight against Soviet imposition (2007:138-
140). It is in this way that a pre-Soviet, 
Ukrainian-born icon such as Taras 
Shevchenko, refurbishes and reassesses 
what it means to be united under a free 
Ukraine. 
The ability of the Ukrainians to have 
freedom of expression is clearly shown in 
their ability to redefine visual symbols. Yet 
since their independence in 1991 Ukrainians 
have had more leisure to express their 
discontent in the political arena. In 2004, the 
first democratic elections since Ukrainians 
gained their independence took place. The 
presidential elections were held between the 
supporters of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor 
Yanukovych; the polls resulted with 
Yanukovych in the lead (Yekelchyk 
2007:216). Evidence proving that the 
election was disturbed by massive fraud was 
promptly revealed to the public (Bilaniuk 
2005:195). The results had immediate and 
enduring effects for the Ukrainian people 
who saw this as political corruption.  
A second round of voting was 
organized in late 2004 with Yanukovych’s 
party ready to announce him as the winner. 
In protest against the corruption, thousands 
of Ukrainians and supporters from other 
countries gathered in Kiev’s Independence 
Square for what was called the Orange 
Revolution (Yekelchyk 2007:216-217). 
Dressed and carrying imagery in 
Yushchenko’s campaign color of orange, 
masses of people gathered in the square for 
non-violent sit-ins and strikes each day until 
Yushchenko was successfully brought into 
office as Ukraine’s first democratically 
elected president. The symbolism of Kiev as 
both the capital of Ukraine and a central 
point in between a divided country makes 
the protest of the Orange Revolution a 
national moment for Ukraine. Taking place 
in Independence Square, the Orange 
Revolution was a political statement 
demonstrating the values held by 
Ukrainians, and the direction in which they 
wanted to steer their country in the future. 
 
No Space for Remembering: Social 
Repression in Belarus 
While there is much externalized 
tension and controversy over political issues 
and their materialized symbols in Ukraine, 
there is little tolerance for anti-Soviet 
expression in the country’s northern 
neighbor; Belarus. Since 1994 President 
Alexander Lukashenka, as part of a 
government of former communists, has 
administered a dictatorship in the model of 
Soviet ideology and nostalgia (Szporer 
2000:474). As one of the most politically 
and socially repressed states in Europe; 
Belarus and its sense of national identity is 
considerably tied to Russia and the former 
USSR (Szporer 2000:476-7). Their 
historical relationship arises from the Slavic 
origin myth of Kieven Rus, which in 
addition to defining Russians, defined 
Ukrainians as the little Russians and 
Belarusians as white Russians among the 
Slavic nationalities (Wilson 1997:184). In 
contemporary discourse, Belarus’ identity 
on the national scale is so deeply tied to this 
conceptual origin that the country hardly has 
a distinct national identity of its own 
(Szporer 2000:477, Wilson 1997:183-5). 
Lukashenka’s policy does not only stress its 
relationship with Russia, but ties his 
ideology specifically to the concept of 
Soviet Russia, so much so that even Belarus 
is more pro-Soviet than Russia in the post-
Soviet era (Titarenko 2000:233). 
Belarus’s capital city Minsk, 
exemplifies this influence. Independence 
Avenue, praspekt Nezalezhnasci, connects 
the Minsk House of Government where a 
monument of Lenin stands proudly in front, 
to Victory Square at the opposite end in the 
city’s center. Victory Monument stands at 
the square’s center, which does not represent 
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Belarusian victory or independence 
specifically, but is a memorial to the victory 
of Soviet leaders in the defeat of Nazi 
Germany. The monument is decorated with 
a replica of the Order of Victory, one of the 
highest recognitions given to soldiers in the 
Red Army who served with distinction 
(Bates 2007). Beneath the monument in the 
city’s metro underpass is another memorial, 
which also honors the Soviet party for 
liberating the Belarusians from the Nazis.  
Pro-Soviet expression in Minsk is 
evident at the national level, which is made 
clear by the city’s visual organization and 
monumental decorations. The aesthetics of 
the city and its governmental choice of 
whom to commemorate is reflective of 
Lenin’s original plan to “educate” the urban 
masses through socialist imagery (Wanner 
1998:176). The presidency of Alexander 
Lukashenka has proven difficult to speak out 
against in Belarus, especially in the capital 
of Minsk. Following the reelection of 
Lukashenka on December 19th 2010, riots 
broke out in front of the House of 
Government (RT 2010). Thousands of 
protestors believing the election to be 
undemocratic and fraudulent gathered 
outside of the building carrying flags, some 
trying to break into the building. Many of 
the protestors were beaten by riot police, and 
about 600 people were detained for 
participating in “mass disturbances” (BBC 
2010). Lukashenka accused demonstrators 
of “banditry”, and refused to acknowledge 
any criticism that the election was 
undemocratic (BBC 2010). 
Like many of its East European 
neighbors, the future in Belarus is politically 
and economically unstable. Rather than 
breaking free from communist control and a 
Soviet mentality, many Belarusians have 
experienced “social inertia” in regards to 
moving forward (Titarenko 2000:246). Still 
more are afraid in speaking out against 
oppression in fear of Lukashenka, which 
makes little room for embracing a 
Belarusian identity detached from the 
former USSR. 
 
Theoretical Reflections: Heritage as 
Performance 
Speaking out in the name of 
independence requires the realization that 
national, ethnic and personal values have 
been rejected in favor of a repressive 
regime. For people to reflect on their 
heritage and externalize nationalistic 
meaning is a profound accomplishment, 
especially after years of enforced 
Sovietization. The repression of ethno-
nationalism as well as cultural values has 
spurred many people to participate in public 
movements that oppose political occupation. 
To further my analogies discussed so far in 
this article, I utilize the ideas of symbolic 
anthropologist Victor Turner. His theory of 
performance pertains to social roles in the 
context of interactive, human behavior. For 
Turner these social roles are recognized in 
public and are often dramatic in nature; 
resembling a theatrical drama itself or a 
significant event initiated by a group of 
people (Turner 1988:81).  
The activity and discourse taking 
place around visual symbols of Soviet 
ideology exemplify Turner’s theory of 
performance. Visitors to museums hosting 
Soviet-era monuments perform a reciprocal 
exchange of ideas with the exhibit; 
interpretations are made of what is seen and 
returned with personal thoughts and 
emotions. A city aesthetically designed on 
the basis of a rejected ideology reflects a 
controversial process of slow change or 
stagnation. And massive crowds gathering 
together in opposition of a corrupt 
presidential election are intrinsically 
engaged in performance. They are actors in 
a social setting designed to generate ideas in 
response to imagery, and by harboring 
diverse perspectives of what is being 
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experienced, people recognize a sense of 
identity.  
A component of Victor Turner’s 
performance theory is the concept of 
communitas; described as a transitional state 
of mind that develops as a response to 
atypical experiences (Moore 2009:247). The 
mentality that communitas evokes is directly 
involved with effecting change. According 
to Turner it is a “law of natural wholeness” 
in which separate, dynamic entities interact 
with one another and figuratively create a 
sense of wholeness (Turner 1988:83). There 
are individual performances, and there are 
collective performances that together 
embody human process. By making a 
performance in a public arena, especially 
during what is referred to as a liminal or 
transitional period, ideas are generated that 
appeal to a wider audience. Performance 
theory’s notion of liminality is especially 
applicable to the transitional experience of 
the former USSR and its republics.  
Turner (1988) also states that his 
theory of performance is self-reflective, and 
can be applied to the concept of constructing 
a sense of national identity. Performance is 
reflective on an individual level in a way 
that allows a person, through social 
performance, to learn more about oneself. 
Performance allows a group of human 
beings, whether a few people, a community 
or entire nation to learn more about 
themselves as an entirety by interacting with 
or observing other groups (Turner 1988:81). 
Without making an individual or collective 
performance in public, the ideas put forth by 
that performance cannot be scrutinized or 
learned from. The point here is to 
communicate important ideas through 
cultural performances, which Turner 
(1988:82), expresses can be just as effective 
in a non-verbal and, I suggest, visual format. 
 If performance is dynamically self-
reflexive, then the act of drawing from ideas 
about heritage in pursuit of expressing 
national identity is also a performance. 
Furthermore, a visual approach to this goal, 
in light of Turner is communicatively 
expansive. National identity cannot be 
realized or properly conveyed without 
drawing on historical events and traditions. 
Metaphorically people are bound together 
with these elements, especially during a 
period of liminality as suggested above. In 
the transition from the collapse of the USSR 
into the post-Soviet era, national identity is 
such a contested issue because there is now 
space to identify as more than Soviet. In 
forging a renewed sense of national identity, 
visual reminders of peoples’ heritage can 
effectively communicate who people are in a 
reflexive way. Soviet heritage has become 
part of how people form identity in Eastern 
Europe today because several generations 
lived through it, and it is not an easy concept 
to erase or separate from.  
To demonstrate the public character 
of human performance as it applies to 
heritage and national identity, Turner (1988) 
describes a final component to his theory of 
performance. I agree that meaning is created 
in public spaces, at least with the exchange 
of ideas at the national level. Furthermore, I 
contend that certain circumstances render a 
performance, symbolic icon, or heritage site 
of great or little worth. For Turner, 
performance is public because it is a social 
role that allows people to be self-reflexive 
based on what others are doing. However, 
he describes performance as a structure that 
has a beginning, middle, and an end (Moore 
2009:251). He clearly states that the 
meaning generated from social 
performances is “bound up with termin-
ation”, and that the significance or value of 
something is not evident or relevant until 
after it is over and passed (Turner 1988:97).   
I disagree with Turner’s assertion 
that performance is conclusive. Meaning is 
not condemned to termination, nor does it 
become important after the fact. Rather I 
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draw on the ideas of anthropologist James 
Fernandez to support the concept that the 
meaning of heritage and national identity is 
constantly at play and in flux. Rather than 
termination, people fight for their identities 
through imagery and support it through what 
Fernandez calls the “play of tropes”, or a 
series of metaphors that are constantly 
interacting with one another to create 
meaning (Moore 2009:300). In response to 
Turner and Fernandez in the context of post-
Soviet Eastern Europe, meaning is generated 
during performance and it does not cease to 
be of importance when it comes to heritage 
and national identity. This is why Soviet-era 
imagery and contemporary memorialization 
of these political signifiers continue to 
generate meaning into the present day and 
reinforce the proliferation of nostalgia for a 
socialist lifestyle. The Communist Party 
performed a political statement under 
Stalinism and people are still thinking about 
it.  
As discussed above, scholars refer to 
heritage as a form of “the contemporary… 
use of the past” (Graham et al. 2000:17), and 
as a “social practice” that is not limited to 
the material world (Smith 2006:11-13). 
Heritage as a practice is a continuous force, 
and like national identity it is not something 
that simply ends. When visiting a museum 
for example, the participant is physically 
guided through an entrance and eventually 
exits the museum space. Yet, the visitor 
participates in the museum as a performance 
because he or she actively engages with 
what is on display, and interprets the 
imagery and concepts (West 2010:127). The 
experience continues in the mind of the 
observer. On a greater level, a collective 
effort to bring about change, even if people 
join in opposition for one day will have a 
lasting effect. A historical event that has 
changed peoples’ lives does not terminate 
but it continues to influence people into the 
future. The collective group or individual 
participants are examples of Turner’s self-
reflexivity, but this concept does not 
terminate in the way he suggests. In the 
following section, I demonstrate that by 
engaging in practices of heritage and 
expressing national identity, human 
performance is a continuous process. 
 
In Pursuit of Heritage: Performances of 
Freedom 
Although much of today’s post-
Soviet population has experienced economic 
instability and pine for the security of a 
socialist lifestyle, the mentality of East 
Europeans just before the collapse of 
communism was to externalize nationalistic 
sentiment and reclaim independence. I 
suggest that Turner’s concept of 
performance and achieving communitas is 
applicable to the demise of the USSR as 
well as events in the post-Soviet era.  
A powerful demonstration of human 
agency in utilizing a non-Soviet heritage 
was the Baltic Way; the organization of a 
pan-national human chain between 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1989 
(Kesekamp 2010:68). While recognizing the 
cultural diversity and individual nationalities 
of each state, the political histories were 
similar enough to unify the three nations 
together for the peaceful protest against 
Soviet occupation. On August 23rd more 
than two million people joined hands in a 
chain that connected Vilnius, Riga and 
Tallinn. The human chain spanned roughly 
six hundred kilometers (Kesekamp 
2010:68). The initial protest was followed 
by candlelit demonstrations in each of the 
Baltic capitals, in which people displayed 
flags and ribbons of symbolic color to honor 
the victims of Soviet oppression (Groudis 
2009:B3, BalticWay.Net 2008).  
Thought to have helped with the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, the Baltic 
Way was celebrated again on its 20th 
anniversary in 2009. A relay race entitled 
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“Heartbeat to Baltic” was initiated at one 
end in Tallinn and the other in Vilnius, so 
that participants ran the Baltic Way’s 
original path and finished at Riga’s Freedom 
Monument (BalticWay.Net 2008). This 
monument specifically commemorates 
freedom from the Soviet Union prior to 
Latvia’s second occupation (Taubman 
1997:A14). Its choice as the destination for 
reliving and celebrating the Baltic Way 
signifies the strength of visual heritage. The 
use of a common Baltic heritage in place of 
a Soviet heritage expressed by AHD 
directly, if not ironically rejects the Soviet 
political agenda and national identity. 
Furthermore, a chain of youths gathered in 
Cathedral Square, Vilnius to replicate the 
joined hands and patriotic environment that 
elevated hopes twenty years prior. The 
masses of people that gathered together for a 
peaceful cause were visually expressive, and 
became a form of heritage in practice 
through reliving and celebrating past events, 
and acknowledging a life lived under 
communism. Much of the population is 
frustrated with the ongoing hardships of 
rapid change, but the Baltic Way is a 
reminder of the unity the three nations felt in 
an effort to stand against former Soviet 
oppression (Groudis 2009:B3). 
Catherine Wanner has suggested that 
social remembering is important for 
fostering closure to traumatic events and 
controversial issues from recent history 
(1998:175). As I have discussed in this 
article, visual media in Eastern Europe has 
symbolized a prominence of Soviet heritage, 
and has had significant impact on shaping 
the public’s concept of national identity and 
political allegiance. Since the collapse of 
communism, icons of Soviet ideology have 
been subject to reinterpretation, in many 
ways that are just as contentious as 
assimilating to the Soviet ideology in the 
first place. From an anthropological 
perspective, the concept of utilizing heritage 
is crucial to understanding how people shape 
their cultural identities according to national 
values. Especially in countries like the 
Baltic States, Ukraine and Belarus that have 
experienced political and socioeconomic 
stress, national identity should be a 
strengthening factor toward stability. As 
these countries move forward into a brighter 
future, much ethnographic research must be 
done in order to understand peoples’ 
changing relationships with the past. This is 
an important area of inquiry because the 
physical alterations of heritage sites and 
public values are shaped by one another and 
continue to change over time and space. 
While my primary focus has been to 
demonstrate the power of visual heritage in 
lieu of Soviet ideology, further research 
should be done on the intangible, local and 
private spheres of heritage and its influence 
on national identity. Visual expressions, if 
harnessed in a way that allows people to 
reconcile with the past, can positively 
rebuild and strengthen notions of national 
identity in the future.  
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